虚妄の巨城
武田薬品工業の品行

　武田薬品の、２０２０年３月期決算が発表された。売上高は、３兆２９１１億８８００万円に達したが、これも買収したアイルランドの旧シャイアーの製品が通期で連結対象に加わった事が大きい。一見順調のようだが、営業利益は１００４億８００万円に留まり、前年比で見ると実に５７・８％のマイナスというありさま。そのため営業利益率は、３・１％しかない。１部上場で製薬が本業ではない会社も含む医薬事業品を扱う主要42社の同期決算を含む直近の決算全体では、営業利益率が平均で６・４％のプラスだから、ここでは「武田の一人負け」ぶりが際立つ。

自己資本利益率の異様な低さ

　製薬各社の売上高順で見ても、上位20社中で武田よりも営業利益率で劣るのは、15位の日医工の１・５％ぐらいだ（営業利益でマイナスだった田辺三菱製薬を除く）。買収により売上高は単純計算で膨らんだものの、肝心の営業利益率の面ではお寒い限り。それに加えて、以前から指摘されている企業の利益獲得の効率性に関する指標である自己資本利益率（ＲＯＥ）の低さは相変わらずで、今期決算で０・90という目を疑うような低さ。売上高が業界一で３兆円を超えながら、ここまでＲＯＥが極端に低い企業が他にあるだろうか。

　ちなみに、売上高２位の大塚ホールディングス（ＨＤ）のＲＯＥは７・３３％。以下、アステラス製薬１５・３４％、第一三共１０・１０％、エーザイ１８・６４％、中外製薬１９・５７％、大日本住友製薬７・９％、田辺三菱製薬４・２０％、塩野義製薬１７・９６％、協和キリン１０・１０％という具合（一部19年度決算期を使用）。やはり、武田の異様な低さが際立つ。

　昨年６月の武田の株主総会前に、議決権行使助言会社大手の米インスティテューショナル・シェアホルダー・サービシーズ（ＩＳＳ）は、ＲＯＥの低さを主な理由として、武田社長兼最高経営責任者（ＣＥＯ）のクリストフ・ウェバーの再任に反対推奨すると発表したのは記憶に新しい。だが、「低い」と指摘した根拠は１９年３月期決算の３％を指していた。１年経って、これがさらに３分の１以下に悪化したわけだ。

　ＩＳＳが今年の株主総会でウェバーの進退に関しどのような推奨をするか興味深いが、普通なら経営者の資質を疑われて当然だろう。前出の上位20社中、武田のようにＲＯＥが１％以下の例は皆無。営業利益率で唯一武田より劣る日医工ですら、４・４２％だ。

　これというのも、旧シャイアーの巨額買収に伴う巨大な有利子負債の賜物であるのは明白だろう。いくら武田が買収で売上高を３兆円台に乗せたとはいえ、結局は買収完了から約１年半たっても経営内容の悪化が止まらないという事実を、ＲＯＥは雄弁に物語ってはいまいか。

　このため、今年６月の武田の株主総会を前に、創業家筋の株主を中心とした「武田薬品の将来を考える会」は既に動き出していた。４月２４日に発表した「株主提案」では、以下のようにＲＯＥについて触れている。

　「公表済の２０１８年度実績値では、貴社のＲＯＥは３％と日系大手医薬品企業の同指標（第一三共約８％、アステラス約１７％、エーザイ約１０％）に比べて著しく低く、またウェバー社長在任５年間の株価推移と配当額を合算した株主総利回りもマイナス27％（一年平均△５％）と日系同業（第一三共３１８％、アステラス△２％、エーザイ２％）に比べて著しく低い」

　このため「株主提案」では、「会社の持続的な成長を促し中長期的な企業価値の向上を図るとの観点からの助言を行うことができる社外取締役を選任することが不可欠」とし、「投資家の視点から企業業績を評価する証券業界に長年勤務」してきたあおぞら証券顧問の伊藤武の選任を要求。だが、武田側は５月15日付で、「当社取締役会において同提案について反対することを決議いたしました」とそっけなく返答した。

　確かに武田の社外取締役は、６人いる日本人のうち取締役会議議長で小松製作所顧問の坂根正弘以下、「投資家の視点から企業業績を評価する証券業界」経験者はいないようだが、ＲＯＥの問題についてはどう考えているのだろう。それとも、とかく耳にする「機能不全」とか「お飾り」といった世間の風評のように、耳の痛い進言は避けているのだろうか。

　いずれにせよ、旧シャイアーの買収が完了してから１年半近く経っても、買収のメリットが誰の目から見ても明白になったとは言い難く、巨額買収に見合った利益が生み出されるのかどうか、未だ判然としていない。ウェバーの買収決断の最終評価もまだ早い面もあるだろうが、ＲＯＥ等に見られる経営の指標からして現時点では、到底「合格点」には達していないだろう。

　このため、「武田薬品の将来を考える会」の以下の主張は、必ずしもためにする批判ではないような印象を強くする。

経営者を監視するガバナンスが機能不全

　「ウェバーＣＥＯの報酬（１８億円）はなんと、この４年間（２０１８年度まで）で倍増、２０１９年度には２０億円とさらに増加し、２位のファイザーを超えるのではと予想されています。ウェバーＣＥＯは、経営の選択と集中と称して、ノンコア事業、優良資産などの多くを売却し、さらに国内を中心に多くの従業員を解雇することによって業績改善を図りました。しかし、現在タケダのＲＯＥは０・９％へと３・０ポイント低下し、配当成長率はゼロ、ＴＳＲはマイナス27％、タケダの株主は、シャイアー社買収案件の前後に、全体で２兆円の損害を被っているのです。このような経営者の報酬がなぜ、増加し続けるのでしょうか。欧米企業であれば、ＣＥＯ報酬の返還と解任を要求されて然るべきことと思っています］（５月28日提出の「株主提案権行使に至る理由について」）。

　ここでの「２位のファイザー」云々は、18年12月期決算までの世界の製薬会社の売上高トップ10のうち、５３６・47億㌦と第２位だったファイザーのＣＥＯ報酬が19・７億円と、当時トップ10にも入っていなかった武田のウェバーとさほど大差なかった点を指す。トップのロシェのＣＥＯ報酬が１３億円であったのを考慮すれば、なおさらウェバーの「好待遇」が不自然に写る。

　日本企業として、史上最高額の海外Ｍ＆Ａ（企業の合併・買収）をやってのけたウェバーの事。今さらおいそれと辞任するわけにはいかないのだろうが、武田のＲＯＥが冷厳に示しているのは、３兆円を超える売上高の陰に隠れた有利子負債にあえぐ経営の実態だけではない。同時に、「経営者による自己利益の追求を監視するガバナンス（企業統治）が機能していない」（同）という内部事情も露わにしているように思える。（敬称略）

The operating income margin for the 120th fiscal year ended March 31 was "one-person defeat for Takeda."
Gigantic castle of fiction
Takeda Pharmaceutical's conduct

Takeda's financial results for FY3/20 were announced.
Revenue reached ¥3,291,188 million, largely due to the inclusion of the former Irish Shearer products in the consolidation for the full year.
At first glance, operating income was only ¥10,408 million, down 57.8% from the previous year.
As a result, the operating profit margin is only 3.1%.
In the most recent financial results, including the results of the consolidated financial statements of 42 major pharmaceutical companies, including those listed in the first section and whose pharmaceuticals business includes companies in which pharmaceuticals is not a core business, the operating profit margin is positive at an average of 6.4%. This is the first time that Takeda loses one person.

Unusual low return on equity

Among the top 20 pharmaceutical companies in terms of sales, the operating profit margin is inferior to Takeda's by about 1.5% (excluding Mitsubishi Tanabe Pharma Co., Ltd., which had a negative operating profit) in 15th place.
Although sales increased by a simple calculation as a result of the acquisition, the core operating profit margin is cold.
In addition, the low return on equity (ROE), which has been previously pointed out as an indicator of the efficiency of profits earned by enterprises, remains unchanged and is low enough to doubt that it will be 0.90 in the current fiscal year.
Are there other enterprises whose ROE is so low that sales exceed ¥3 trillion per industry?
Incidentally, Otsuka Holdings, which ranks second in sales, has a 7.33% ROE.
Astellas Pharma 15.34%, Daiichi Sankyo 10.10%, Eisai 18.64%, Chugai 19.57%, Dainippon Sumitomo Pharma 7.9%, Dainippon Mitsubishi Tanabe 4.20%, Shionogi 17.96%, Kyowa Kirin 10.10% (partially used for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2007).
Takeda's unusual low score again.
In memory, prior to Takeda's shareholder meeting last June, Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) said it would oppose Mr. Takeda's reelection of Christoph Weber, the company's president and chief executive, largely because of its low ROE.
But the reason he cited as "low" was 3% of the company's fiscal year ended March 31, 2007.
After a year, this has worsened to less than one-third.
It's interesting to see what ISS recommends at this year's meeting about Webber's progress, but it's usually natural to question management's qualifications.
None of the top 20 companies mentioned above have a ROE of 1% or less, such as Takeda.
Even Nikko, the only company with a lower operating margin than Takeda, has an operating margin of 4.42%.
It is obvious that this is the result of the massive interest-bearing debt associated with the massive acquisition of the former Shear.
Even though Takeda acquired Takeda to raise its sales to the 3 trillion yen level, ROE should say eloquently that even about a year and a half after the acquisition has been completed, the company's business performance will not deteriorate.
Accordingly, prior to the Takeda General Meeting of Shareholders in June this year, the Takeda Pharmaceutical Future Forum, led by shareholders of founders, had already begun to move forward.
In the shareholder proposal announced on April 24, the company mentioned ROE as follows.
"The announced results for fiscal 2018 show that your company's ROE is 3%, significantly lower than that of major Japanese pharmaceutical companies (Daiichi Sankyo, about 8%, Astellas, about 17%, and Eisai, about 10%), and that the total shareholder yield, which combines stock price changes and dividend amounts over the five years of President Weber's tenure, is also significantly lower than that of the Japanese pharmaceutical companies (Daiichi Sankyo, 318%, Astellas, 2%, and Eisai, 2%)."
For this reason, the shareholder proposal states that it is indispensable to appoint an outside director who can provide advice from the viewpoint of promoting sustainable growth of the company and improving corporate value over the medium to long term. It also calls for the appointment of Mr. Mu Itozora, a securities advisor who has worked for many years in the securities industry to evaluate corporate performance from the viewpoint of investors.
However, on May 15, Takeda quietly replied, "We decided to oppose the proposal at our board meeting."
Indeed, Takeda's outside directors do not seem to have any experience in the securities industry in evaluating corporate performance from an investor's point of view. But what do you think about ROE's issues? Takeda's outside director is the chairman of the Board of Directors, and Mr. Masahiro Sakane, an advisor to Komatsu Manufacturing Co., Ltd., as well as the chairman of the Board of Directors?
Or are you avoiding the noisy advocacy of "dysfunction" or "ornamentation" that you hear?
Nevertheless, nearly a year and a half after the completion of the acquisition, it is hard for anyone to say that the benefits of the acquisition have become clear, and it remains unclear whether it will generate a profit commensurate with the big deal.
While the final evaluation of Weber's acquisition decision may still be early, it is unlikely that Weber's "passing" score has been reached at this point, based on management indicators such as ROE.
For this reason, the following assertions of the Takeda Pharmaceutical Future Committee have a strong impression that they are not necessarily criticisms.

Governance overseeing management fails

"Mr. Weber's compensation (1.8 billion yen) is expected to double over the past four years (until fiscal 2018), and to increase to 2 billion yen in fiscal 2019, exceeding Pfizer's second-place ranking.
Mr. Webber worked hard to improve his performance by selling many of his non-core businesses and outstanding assets, as well as by firing many of his employees, mainly in Japan, in the name of "selection and concentration of management."
At present, however, Takeda's ROE has declined by 3.0 percentage points to 0.9%, the dividend growth rate is zero, the TSR is minus 27%, and Takeda's shareholders suffer a total loss of 2 trillion yen around the time of the acquisition of Shire.
Why does this manager's compensation continue to increase?
European and U.S. companies should be required to return the CEO's compensation and dismiss the CEO (May 28, "Reasons for Exercising Shareholder Proposal Rights").
Pfizer, the second largest pharmaceutical company in terms of sales by December 2006, was the second-largest, with $536.4.7 billion. Pfizer's CEO compensation was 1.97 billion, which was not much higher than Takeda's Weber, which was not among the top 10 companies at that time.
Given Roche's top CEO compensation of 1.3 billion yen, Weber's "favorable treatment" is even more unnatural.
Weber, the largest Japanese company in history, has been involved in overseas M&As (mergers and acquisitions).
While it is not possible to resign, Takeda's ROE is harshly evident not only in the current state of management, where interest-bearing debt is hidden behind sales of more than 3 trillion yen.
At the same time, it seems that internal conditions such as "governance that monitors the pursuit of self-interest by management is not functioning" (i.e., corporate governance) are also evident.
(Honorific title omitted)